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1. COACTION AND ITS RESULTS
While health and suffering are intrinsic to living 
bodies, the relevant causes are not always based on 
the function and dysfunction of living tissue. In hu-
man beings, tissue connects microbiology to organs, 
the skin, the “Self” and a world in which, together, 
we are moved to sense-making. Remarkably, when 
the authors of the volume proposed collaboration, 
this theme had not yet emerged. We had little sense 
of what would arise from using a biosemiotic lens to 
view health and health care as relational phenomena. 
The outcome, Signifying Bodies, is the result of coac-
tion. Together, we have used the writing and thinking 
of others to restructure our thoughts around a striking 
idea: health is a non-local phenomenon.
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of the volume and, building on our theme, consider 
theoretical and practical consequences that we hope 
will develop in the aftermath of our collaboration. The 
central claim is that, though based in bodies, health is 
irreducible to individual states. Accordingly, we em-
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cond, we trace this to what are termed the principles 
of non-locality and non-localizability. Whether we are 
concerned with investigating or aiding the health of 
living beings, it is important to recognise that their en-
counters with the world (and with us) shape both the 
environment and how they act, think and feel. Health 
arises in a complex, culturally extended ecology (Stef-
fensen, 2009). It is inseparable from how we deal with 
inert matter while, at times, using language and lan-
guaging. We become “Selves” whose being – how we 
feel, think and act – is co-determined by social and 
ecological factors deriving from a history of actions 
by signifying bodies. Health depends not only on the 
functioning of living tissue but also on how the “Self” 
draws on a history that stretches back to the begin-
nings of organic life. In short, health uses interaction 
with people, technologies and the living world. It ani-
mates signifying bodies and, as such, is established, 
maintained and declines together with the communi-
ties that sustain each person’s lifespan of interactions. 
2. THE UNIFYING THEME
The contributors to Signifying Bodies come from dif-
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draw on diverse literatures. Nonetheless, how we ap-
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argued by Alfredo Dinis (this vol.), a relational turn. 
This is clearest when it comes to how we conceptualise 
‘body’. Even where endorsing the biomechanical view 
of human functions that dominates Western medi-
cine, as explained below, we reject the Cartesian view 
of bodily mechanisms. While microbiology makes 
each of us a system of cells and tissues, we stress that 
these live in an environment where, in different time-
scales, bodies exchange and share meaning with pro-
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cesses beyond the skin. Health is relational, bodies are 
always in dialogue, and therefore much is gained from 
biosemiotic description. Far from invoking an imma-
terial ‘mental’ sphere, we focus investigations on the 
lived sense-making. This occurs both within and be-
tween humans who, we assume, have co-evolved with 
their environments. From this perspective, individual 
bodies are always extending; being-together is carried 
by intercorporeal resonances. Not only is the body inhe-
rently dialogical but the ecology is embodied to the ex-
tent that it allows us to be sensitive to the sensitivity of 
others, or what Stuart (this vol.) calls enkinaesthesia. It 
is this emphasis on human interdependency that dif-
ferentiates our perspective from much contemporary 
thinking. Rather than invoke ‘embodiment’, we turn 
to bodies whose health and suffering arise as living 
subjects engage with each other and the world.
The relational perspective draws on a changing 
view of health. Indeed, it is precisely the success of 
biomedicine that has brought home the limits of bio-
logical models. Not surprisingly, this appears clearly 
in the ‘psychological’ problems faced by therapists. 
Not only are the limits of biomedicine seen in the tra-
dition of relational psychology (see, Dinis, this vol.; 
Major, this vol.; Oliveira, this vol.) but, in a different 
guise, they appear in the case studies of DLC ( !"#$!%
buted Language and Cognition) presented by Brands 
et al. (this vol.). All concur on the importance of what 
Hoffmeyer (this vol.) calls the body’s interface, the in-
between that arises as we enact experience. We rely 
on relationality and intersubjectivity: while bodies are 
subject to internal dysfunctions, much suffering and 
disease spreads as the body’s interface connects mind 
and society. This shapes feeling, action and how we 
speak or, in other words, produces a phenomenology 
of health. What appear as individual problems – espe-
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cially given individualistic Western modes of interpre-
tation – can often be traced to boundary crossing. The 
health of an individual, let alone a community, turns 
out to be trans-individual and, in this sense, relational.
Since health has a phenomenological aspect, we 
depend on body-brain-world relations. This echoes 
how 21st century cognitive science differs from earlier 
work that relied on systematic comparisons between 
mind and machine. On the classic view cognition was 
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the brain, and within the brain to encapsulated modules 
(e.g. Fodor, 1983). Neo-phrenologist approaches mimic 
physics by positing small units that, together, are said 
to shape mental function. Today, however, cognition is 
increasingly contrasted with computation. It is con-
ceptualised as the functioning of complex adaptive 
systems that draw on and, at times, construct envi-
ronments. Cognition is embodied, embedded and 
inseparable from the public resources of the world 
(e.g. Robbins and Aydede, 2009). On more radical 
views, cognition is distributed or emerges as a body 
engages with its ever changing ecology. Early elabo-
ration of such views came in studies of Tetris (Kirsh 
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computer screen to ‘see’ their size and form. They pre-
ferred these epistemic actions over so-called ‘mental 
rotations’. Given how acting while perceiving changes 
our cognitive powers, it is mistaken to identify cog-
nition or problem-solving with neural processes. It is 
not the brain that thinks, it is the brain-body-world 
totality that thinks (even if the totality thinks that it is 
the individual brain that thinks!). 
From a distributed perspective, one acknowledges 
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cally, the importance of interaction. Of course, the so-
cial world affects how we live, feel and enact biologi-
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cal change: it affects health and, more starkly, health 
care. Psychological, social and biological aspects of 
health and suffering are quite clearly bound up with 
what we do together. We cannot separate events 
within the skin (‘health’) from what lies beyond the 
border (‘health care’). In making this claim, we echo 
the changes in cognitive science. For, as we have seen, 
recent work denies that meaning in the skull (‘cogni-
tion’) is separable from meaning as displayed in the 
world (‘communication’). Indeed, it is only in this way 
that the biological, the individual and the supra-indi-
vidual can co-function. Accordingly, we rethink inter-
action (‘between’-action). Many approaches to other-
directed actions draw on Conversation Analysis (CA) 
and the micro-sociological tradition of ethnomethodo-
logy. By making the assumption that communication is 
public (and cognition private), interaction is restricted 
to exchange of meaning through turn-taking. But inte-
raction is all too glibly explained by systematic use 
of social norms and habits, e.g. in the form of turn- 
taking “rules” and “word meaning.” Our investiga-
tions show that the social domain is inseparable from 
the bio-cognitive. Communicative acts neither report 
inner cognitive life, nor construe communicative mea-
ning. What we do, and especially what we do within a 
community, is inherently bio-cognitive. Interaction is, 
among other things, a way of cognizing or, perhaps, 
ensuring that cognitive resources are shared between 
people.
This is clear in Pike’s (this vol.) work on sufferers 
from rheumatoid arthritis. By examining how signify-
ing bodies resonate we learn much about their lived 
identity. Signifying bodies serve as a methodologi-
cal resource for exploring drug adherence (and non-
adherence). As cognitive activity, interaction draws 
heavily on experience. While Pike describes this with 
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respect to focus groups, the work can be generalized. 
Thus Galosia et al. (this vol.) traces decision making to 
how, in simulation, events are coordinated between a 
‘patient’, doctor and nurse. Caring is partly cognitive 
and, at the same time, has a constitutive role in so-
cial context. Indeed, as Pedersen shows (this vol.), or-
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ple say, feel and do. Taken together, this set of papers 
brings home the importance of actions performed 
within a distributed cognitive system that includes 
more than one human participant. These settings de-
pend on coaction: this is so important to human life 
there is a case for applying the term cognication – i.e. 
cogni(tion)-(communi)cation – to such distributed 
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ples of cognizing together where parties link what is 
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gives rise to the co-action analysis (Steffensen et al., 
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on how people care for a ‘patient’.
In focusing on bodies, health, minds and interac-
tion, boundaries are found to be “yieldable and mu-
tual” (Stuart, this vol.). All contributors thus deny that 
boundaries are absolute: much health and suffering 
has ‘causes’ that are spread across bodies and insepa-
rable from how the organization of the physical and 
social surround.
3. BOUNDARIES AND THE FALLACY OF SIMPLE LOCATION
When boundaries are non-absolute, something exists 
across boundaries. Without wishing to exaggerate, 
this perturbs Western epistemology and ontology. In 
speaking against one central tenet of a two millennia 
old tradition, Alfred Whitehead suggests,
The Ionian philosophers asked, What is nature made of? 
The answer is couched in terms of stuff, or matter, or ma-
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terial,—the particular name chosen is indifferent—which 
has the property of simple location in space and time, or, 
if you adopt the more modern ideas, in space-time. […] 
The characteristic common both to space and time is that 
material can be said to be here in space and here in time, 
or here" %!"&+(*,0#%2,."%!"("+,-4,*#):"3,'!%#,"&,!&,"/$%*$"
does not require for its explanation any reference to other 
regions of space-time. (Whitehead, 1926: 61f.)
Western science typically adopts an assumption of 
simple location by delimiting the here from the not-
here or an ‘object’ from the ‘world’. In examining 
$,()#$." /," '!3" #$(#" #$%&" (++-5(*$" %2+,3,&" 9!3,--
standing. We thus emphasise what Major (this vol.) 
call states of becoming or, in Steffensen’s (forth.) 
terms, what is called the &$!'(!&)*+ ,-+ ','%),(.)!#/. 
This denies that states or processes can ‘occupy’ a de-
terminate space-time zone. It is thus an ontological 
claim that warns us that even objects like stones exist 
in a state of change, however slow this change may be. 
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space-time zones, they do nevertheless have a high 
density in some space-time zones and yet, in others, 
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What applies to physical objects also characterises living 
bodies and human Selves; and since their potentials 
draw on the past, they evade space-time localization. 
It is a methodological error, therefore, to ascribe in-
violable boundaries to objects. Steffensen (forth.) thus 
posits the &$!'(!&)*+,-+','%),(.)!0.1!)!#/: it is an epis-
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‘objects’. We must not seek to localize the non-local.
By accepting the principles of non-locality and non-
localizability, we demolish the iron curtain between 
1 For instance, cognition is not “brainbound” (to use an ex-
pression from Clark, 2008: xxvii), but extends into the world; 
however the cognitive density is relatively higher in the human 
brain than in, say, the mug next to me.
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person and world, subject and object, mind and body, 
substance and quality. First, dualism is traced to a 
gratuitous assumption that every ‘thing’ has a simple 
location. From an observer’s perspective, this is readily 
understood. If I as a person am here (i.e. if I am sim-
ply located in a here in space-time), then there is a 
non-I that is not-here. On classic views, this ‘world’ is 
&(%3"#5"6,"&,+(-(#,"4-52"/$5" "(2"C("'-&#"+,-&5!"56-
server): thus, a gap divides a person from the ‘world’ 
(or knower and known). Using a phenomenological 
approach, Hoffmeyer (2008) shows how the skin (the 
boundary) can, at once, separate us from the world while 
also being an interface for the non-local. Along similar 
lines, Timo Järvilehto’s (1998) systemic view ascribes 
ontology to the domain of Organism-Environment 
Systems.2 
The epistemological division of subject and object 
depends on the assumption of simple location. It as-
sumes that a subject (the observer) is bound to a per-
son and an object (the observed) to the world, and that 
a local(ized) phenomenon “does not require for its 
explanation any reference to other regions of space-
time” (Whitehead, 1926: 62). According to this line of 
thought, it is possible for an object to be described and 
explained without reference to a subject: objectivism 
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since any description is dependent on a describer, it is 
more precise to see the description as a description of 
the relation between the observer and the observed, 
between subject and object.
While similar challenges have been raised by sub-
atomic physicists, relational psychology also chal-
lenges the subject-object dichotomy. Pursuing this is 
2 This is a more radical view than, say, Andy Clark’s Extended 
Mind Hypothesis (Clark, 2008) because the latter’s functionalist 
view is indifferent to spatial ontology (see, Steffensen, 2009).
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consistent not only with biosemiotics but also the enac-
tive program (cf. Stuart, this vol.) and how human 
perception and action are conceived within ecological 
psychology.3 
The mind-body dichotomy is interwoven with the 
assumption of simple location. The main criterion 
that distinguishes Plato’s immaterial form and his 
material phenomena – or Descartes’ res extensa and 
res cogitans – is whether or not they are localizable. 
This, however, contrasts with Damasio’s widely cited 
critique of Descartes:
the abyssal separation between body and mind, between 
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nitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and the un-
sizable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible 
2%!3"&#944H"IJK"#$,"&,+(-(#%5!"54"#$,"25&#"-,'!,3"5+,-(-
tions of mind from the structure and operation of a bio-
logical organism. (Damasio, 1994: 249f.)
From our non-localist perspective, the error is not 
that of positing an “unsizable, undimensioned, un-
pushpullable, nondivisible” mind. Not at all. Rather, 
these are kinds of properties that make the relevant 
phenomena non-local. The error lies in positing that 
bodies are localizable, i.e. in failing to recognise that 
they extend in space-time. A distributed cognitive 
system is never co-extensive with a human body. As 
we engage with people, artifacts and institutional re-
sources, we establish systems that lack strict bounda-
ries. Descartes’ error is not his ‘non-local’ system but 
rather the fact that he was unwilling or (or unable to) 
give up the assumption of simple location. Instead, 
he returned to a Platonic substance dualism; while he 
correctly rejected mind-within, he failed to conceive 
3 It can be argued that action and perception are two dimen-
sions of the same bundle of phenomena (Noë, 2004).
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of mind-beyond. Indeed, it was not until the time of 
Hegel that philosophers proposed that the subjective 
2%!3"/(&"%!$,-,!#):"%!*52+),#,"C&,,."L-%&('"(!3"M()-
lagher, 2010) or, in modern terms, that humans make 
extensive use of distributed cognition.4 As Stuart 
points out, a “substance-state ontology” rests on the 
assumption of “temporality and spatiality as uniform, 
linear, and regular, consisting of discrete or punctu-
ated events, points, objects, and places” (Stuart, this. 
vol.). It thus seems to be precisely the assumption of 
simple location that prevents us from grasping, say, 
the colour of an ‘object’ relationally (cf. Varela et al., 
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the colour of, say, a leaf, in terms of qualia (or states) 
that “belong to” (“is simple or located in”) a bounded 
entity. In summary, therefore, let us turn again to 
Whitehead:
Of course, substance and quality, as well as simple loca-
tion, are the most natural ideas for the human mind. It 
is the way in which we think of things, and without these 
ways of thinking we could not get our ideas straight for 
daily use. There is no doubt about this. The only question 
is, How concretely are we thinking when we consider na-
ture under these conceptions? My point will be, that we 
(-,"+-,&,!#%!8"59-&,)<,&"/%#$"&%2+)%',3",3%#%5!&"54"%22,-
diate matters of fact. (Whitehead, 1926: 66)
We seem to have mistaken an abstracted version of re-
()%#:"R"5!,"'#"45-"8,##%!8"()5!8"/%#$",<,-:3(:"*5!*,-!&"
such as laundry, food, bike-riding and soccer-playing 
– as the real, concrete world “out there.” Whitehead 
4 Clark too adopts a substance-state ontology: in positing ex%
tended mind, he sometimes writes as if ‘objects’ were part of the 
cognitive process. Not only does this strike many as bizarre but 
it leads Clark to overlook crucial aspects of cognition such as its 
normative dimension, phenomenology and how verbal language 
is integrated with languaging (see, Steffensen, 2009).
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calls this the “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness” 
(Whitehead, 1926: 64). In emphasising this, we make 
the relational turn – one that holds promise for our 
signifying bodies.
4. UNIVERSAL FORCES AND SIMPLE LOCATION
To Whitehead, the “Fallacy of Misplaced Concrete-
ness” is an “occasion of great confusion in philoso-
phy” (ibid.). We may agree on this judgment even if, in 
principle, things need not be so. Just as astronomers 
do not rely on the sun’s ‘movements in the sky’, phi-
losophers, cognitive scientists, biologists and others 
can reject substances, qualities and simple locations. 
 !3,,3."#$,"&*%,!#%'*",!#,-+-%&,"(%2&"(#"("3,,+,-"(!3"
broader view of the universe. In spite of this, main-
stream science has long been guided by the assumption 
of simple location that serves our everyday concerns. 
Not only has this limited the scope of its analyses 
and theories but, perniciously, it has ensured that its 
methods have been severely limited. 
Following Whitehead, the assumption of simple 
location entails that if a substance exists in a here in 
space-time, it exists in a given temporal period. Fur-
ther if that is so, it is equally in existence in any portion 
of that period or, in his terms, “the material is indif-
ferent to the division of time” (Whitehead, 1926: 63), 
and “the transition of time has nothing to do with the 
character of the material” (ibid.). This principle sus-
tains the method of analysis or the division of matter 
into smaller parts. It is a principle, moreover, that can 
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nomy) frogs and cells (as in biology), or utterances and 
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gives rise to formulae and formalisms – modes of des-
cribing existence in terms of properties that are said 
to identify the smallest parts of ‘things’. Hoffmeyer 
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reminds us of the background for Newton’s gravita-
tional theory:
Thomas Hobbes’ bold conjecture, that the social atoms, 
human individuals, posses [sic] essential properties from 
which the appearance of social order among human beings 
can be explained, was transferred by Newton to the natu-
ral world which he saw as constituted, at the micro level, of 
particles with essential properties: hardness, impenetra-
bility, indivisibility and inertia. (Hoffmeyer, 2010: 81f.)
Whether we talk about physical matter, living beings 
or linguistic texts, an analytical approach is radically 
incomplete. We encounter a pulsing that shapes cel-
)9)(-." &96(#52%*"(!3"25-+$5)58%*()"*5!'89-(#%5!D"T"
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gravitational forces, atoms vibrate and planets swirl 
through the universe. Even texts are written by hands, 
bodies and minds. Something moves, something hap-
pens. Hoffmeyer continues:
Newton also claimed that these essential properties could 
not by themselves explain natural phenomena in the ab-
sence of a causative agent, or force, the force of gravity. 
Gravity differs from the essential properties of particles in 
that gravity is not a property of any single particle but an 
enigmatic universal property, unlike anything else known 
to human experience. […] Simply by postulating the exis-
tence of this one force Newton was able to bring the move-
ments of celestial bodies into harmony with bodies at the 
Earth, both kinds of movement being calculable by the 
same set of simple equations. (Hoffmeyer, 2010: 82)
Evidently, the assumption of simple location renders 
it impossible to analyse what Hoffmeyer terms “enig-
matic universal properties.” If they are not now-here, 
they are no-where. Further, if something cannot be 
analysed, the paradigm deems it irreducible to ex%
planation. Given the principle of simple location, ex-
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planation excludes, “any reference to other regions 
of space-time” (Whitehead, 1926: 61f.). Interestingly, 
Newton realised that, in such terms, he had not ex%
plained gravity:
While Newton himself did not think he had explained the 
phenomena [sic], that he so accurately had described, and 
spent the last thirty years of his life searching in vain for 
a true explanation of gravity, most scientists since New-
ton have conceived of the Newtonian laws as the ideal way 
#5"&*%,!#%'*()):"253,)"!(#9-,D"E$,"%!<%&%6),"$(!3"54"T3(2"
Smith and the Darwinists [sic] conception of natural selec-
tion as a source of otherwise mysterious purposeful activi-
ty in animate nature are both deeply indebted to the New-
tonian idea of gravity as an unexplained (divine?) yet – as 
the proponents believe – trustworthy force of lawful uni-
versal intervention in the senseless machinery of economy 
or evolution respectively. (Hoffmeyer, 2010: 82)
Where does it come from, this idea that behind the 
world of simple locations, there are greater forces at 
play, forces that guide the universe in a way that re-
sembles purposefulness? Hoffmeyer makes a paren-
thetic reference to the “divine.” But, surely, it will be 
objected, science is free of that. However, Whitehead 
concurs with Hoffmeyer:
I do not think, however, that I have even yet brought out 
the greatest contribution of medievalism to the forma-
#%5!"54" #$," &*%,!#%'*"25<,2,!#D" IDDDK"  #" %&" #$%&" %!&#%!*#%<,"
conviction, vividly poised before the imagination, which 
is the motive power of research: — that there is a secret, 
a secret which can be unveiled. How has this conviction 
been so vividly implanted in the European mind? […] It 
must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality 
of God, conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah 
and with the rationality of a Greek philosopher. Every de-
tail was supervised and ordered: the search into nature 
could only result in the vindication of the faith in ratio-
nality. […] My explanation is that the faith in the possibi-
lity of science, generated antecedently to the development 
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from medieval theology (Whitehead, 1926:15f.).
The assumption of simple location – and the theologi-
cal motivation of seeking, dare we say, supernatural 
forces in nature – dominated Western science un-
til the rise of subatomic physics. Indeed, it has been 
overthrown in the philosophy of science only with 
structural realism (see, Worrall, 1989; Ladyman et 
al., 2007).5 Until recently, simple location has often 
been used in suggesting that “mathematical formali-
zations as expressing the deepest reality of our world” 
(Hoffmeyer, 2010: 82) or, as formulated by a 20th cen-
tury linguist:
In the natural sciences, it is common to adopt what has 
sometimes been called “the Galilean style”— that is, to 
construct “abstract mathematical models of the universe 
to which at least the physicists give a higher degree of rea-
lity than they accord the ordinary world of sensations.” 
[…] There is no reason to abandon the general approach of 
the natural sciences when we turn to the study of human 
beings and society. Any serious approach to such topics 
will attempt, with whatever success, to adopt “the Galilean 
style.” (Chomsky, 1980: 217ff.)
5 Structural realism can be traced to Worrall (1989) and is 
closely associated with James Ladyman’s work. In his most re-
cent book, together with colleagues (Ladyman, Ross et al., 2007) 
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(e.g. electrons) entails belief that the theories are ‘at least ap-
proximately empirically relevant’. Thus, ‘there really are rela-
tions among the phenomena that theories attribute to the world.’ 
Provided we adopt non-Humean causation, “we need not go as 
far as belief in objects, unobservable or not. […] The positing of 
stable modal relations among the phenomena will do as well” 
(2007: 106).
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While debatable that abstract mathematical models 
presuppose analysis of units into component parts,6 
this is the practice – not only of Chomsky – but of 
many who extend science into the domain of human 
life. If we are to take the principle of non-localizability 
seriously, we are bound to reject any appeal to a “higher 
degree of reality.”
5. THE LIFE SCIENCES AND THE LIVING
While the Galilean framework is powerful, it cannot 
reduce the world to little things. In the life sciences, 
at least, we deal with the living (and the dying). What-
ever the contributors to Signifying Bodies think about 
the Galilean style, our work is post-Cartesian, post-Ba-
conian and post-Newtonian. Indeed, in turning away 
from how objects function, we embrace biosemiosis, 
development, social organization and languaging. In 
turning to the living, our interdisciplinary work spans 
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ence, none of us seek to begin with ‘objects’ that oc-
cupy a simple location. Nor do we assume (pseudo-di-
vine) secrets of nature that Man uses science to unveil. 
Rather, the domain of the living is seen as depending 
on organism-environment relations. It is non-locali-
zable and, at the same time, bound up with more than 
the ‘parts’ and ‘mechanisms’ we attribute to biological 
systems.7 There is, of course, variability, in terms of 
6 Mathematical models need not presuppose entities: they can 
characterize process dynamics. While some would argue that this 
too represent a Gallilean style, this matter need not concern us here.
7 In important work, Bechtel (2008) proposes that we rede-
'!,"#$,"X2,*$(!%&2&U"#$(#"*5!#-%69#,"#5"+&:*$5)58%*()"+$,!52,-
na in terms of – not just parts and mechanisms (or ‘procedures’), 
but as involving ‘modes of organization’. It could be argued that 
#$,&," X253,&" 54" 5-8(!%B(#%5!U" (-," ,1,2+)%',3" 6:" *5!*,+#&" )%7,"
protein synthesis, biosemiotics, languaging and even professio-
nal alliances (see, Pedersen, this vol.). 
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how the general principle is framed. In this context, 
however, we stress that each one of the contributors 
takes as a starting point one of the following three as-
sumptions of simple location: 
 ! The existence of absolute boundaries
 ! The per se existence of individual entities
 ! The description of such entities in terms of essential 
properties
Accordingly, we can distinguish between three groups 
54"!5!0)5*()"#$,5-%,&D"E$,"'-&#"8-59+"54"!5!0)5*()"#$,5-
ries stresses the processual spatiality of cogni tion. Cog-
nitive processes – that are traditionally ascribed to the 
brain – are regarded as non-local. The locus (or non-
locus) of cognition is so central that these theories are 
!(2,3" %!" &+(#%()" #,-2&N" #$9&." 5!,"'!3&"T!3:"L)(-7U&"
Extended Mind Hypothesis (Clark, 2008), and Ed 
Hutchins theory of Distributed Cognition (Hutchins, 
1995; Dror and Harnad, 2008; Cowley, 2007, 2009). 
Both extended and distributed are spatial terms used 
to challenge ‘brain-bound’ views. However, while ex%
tension presupposes an originary core (in the organism), 
distribution"%!<57,&"("',)3"#$,5-:"C*4D"Y#,44,!&,!."Z[[?A"
in that it posits no localized centre. Another non-local 
theory that transgresses boundaries is 1!,%"*2!,#!(" 
(Barbieri, 2007; Hoffmeyer, 2008, 2010, this vol.; Kull 
et al., 2009). For instance, Hoffmeyer’s (2008: 17-38) 
treatment of the skin emphasises permeable bounda-
ries that yield two way crossing. Likewise, the biose-
miotic emphasis on signs" (!3" &%8!%'*(#%5!"+-5*,&&,&"
moves the perspectives from intra-boundary processes 
to inter-boundary processes. When Kull et al. claims 
that “34*+ "*2!,#!(5','%"*2!,#!(+ 6!"#!'(#!,'+ !"+ (,%
extensive with the life—nonlife distinction” (Kull et al., 
2009: 168), they echo Maturana and Varela’s central 
intuition. As Capra (2002) puts it, “The central insight 
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54"#$,"Y(!#%(85"E$,5-:"%&"#$,"%3,!#%'*(#%5!"54"*58!%#%5!."
the process of knowing, with the process of life. […] cog-
nition is the very process of life” (2002: 30). There is, 
however, a difference. In identifying life with cognition, 
the enactivist posits a systemic"5!#5)58:"(!3"("9!%',3"
*58!%#%<,"&:&#,2H"%!",2+$(&%&%!8"&%8!%'*(#%5!."\9))",#"
al.’s ontology depends on sign-exchanging relata. 
The second group of theories emphasises the sys-
temic and supra-individual dimension of non-locality. 
Rather than begin with ‘objects’, the investigator asks 
how what Bang and Døør (2007) term ‘individualities’ 
partake in (and are constituted by) larger, systemic 
wholes. Like many others, this systemic approach de-
rived from Norbert Wiener and Ludwig von Bertalanf-
fy’s General Systems Theory (Bertalanffy, 1969). To-
day, systemic approaches appear in biology, sociology, 
geography, psychology, and other disciplines. We in-
clude in this grouping, for example, systemic psycho- 
logy (Järvilehto, 1998), ecological psychology (Gibson, 
1979; Hodges and Baron, 1992; Hodges, 2007, 2009) 
and a family including Complexity Theory, Complex 
Adaptive Systems Theory and Non-Linear Dynamical 
Systems Theory (Van Orden, 2007). 
The third group takes a non-essentialist, relational 
view. In pursuing this approach to non-locality, there is 
a tendency to emphasise subject-object relations, and 
thus epistemology. A number of thinkers approach the 
living (and the human being) as an experiential sub-
ject. For this reason, they look at how experience (and 
cognition) depend on the human condition, or, in other 
words, a living human body in the biosphere known as 
the Earth. This is illustrated by the theoretical over-
views of Dinis (this vol.) and Major (this vol.) as well 
as the discussion of development (Leal, this vol.), and 
suffering (Oliveira, this vol.). In parallel, Stuart’s (this 
vol.) enactive starting point emphasises the embodied 
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character of cognition, or how a living “Self” takes in a 
relational stance to their surroundings:
Organisms do not passively receive information from 
their environments, which they then translate into in-
#,-!()" -,0+-,&,!#(#%5!&"/$5&," &%8!%'*(!#" <()9," %&" #5" 6,"
added later. Natural cognitive systems are simply not in 
the business of accessing their world in order to build ac-
curate pictures of it. They actively participate in the ge-
neration of meaning in what matters to them; they enact 
a world. Sense-making is a relational and affect-laden 
process grounded in biological organization. (De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo, 2007: 488)
There are both commonalities and striking differences 
between these ways of exploring the non-local; there 
are however, few, if any, attempts to integrate them. 
Though the principle of non-locality has been inde-
+,!3,!#):",&#(6)%&$,3" %!"(" -(!8,"54"',)3&." %#"$(&"!5#"
yet been generalized. Even more strikingly, it has not 
been applied to science itself. It seems that we must 
look to the future to bring us a trans-disciplinary, 
non-local approach to bodily, cognitive and interac-
tional processes. The emerging contours of a hyper-
paradigm (cf. Steffensen, 2006) suggest that each ap-
proach can give and take from other non-local views. 
It is also clear that the variety of what each theory 
works with makes it unlikely that any higher degree of 
reality pertains to mathematical models of things and 
-,)(#%5!&D"](#$,-." ),#" 9&" &#-%<," 45-" (" &*%,!#%'*"unitas 
multiplex (cf. Morin, 1987: 27) or a “unity in diver-
sity” which is also a “diversity in unity.” If we are to 
engage in science as a trans-disciplinary dialogue, we 
29&#"-,*58!%&,"%#&"5/!"-,;,1%<,"!(#9-,D"Y*%,!*,"%#&,)4"
is non-local. It is a self-organizing enterprise that, like 
life (Markoš et al., 2009), is its own designer, while at 
the same time – also like life itself – formed by soci-
etal dynamics:
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Y*%,!*," 5-" &*%,!#%'*" +-(1%&" %&" !5#$%!8"25-," 5-" ),&&" #$(!"
("+(-#%*9)(-"$%&#5-%*()."&5*%()"+-(1%&"(!3"+(-#"54"("&+,*%'*"
socio-cultural order. Different cultures create different 
forms of science and every dominant praxis organizes its 
people and problems in ways and by means that aim at 
the same ends as the culture as a whole. (Bang and Døør, 
2000: 53)
6. INVESTIGATING SIGNIFYING BODIES: THE DISTRIBUTED 
HEALTH INTERACTION PROGRAM
While based in biology, health cannot be identi-
',3" /%#$" 653%):" 49!*#%5!&D" ^%52,3%*()" 45*9&" 5!" #%&-
sue damage needs to be balanced by due concern for 
health interaction. Once we adopt the principle of 
non-localizability, we can trace how health plays out 
as signifying bodies exploit their states of becoming as 
living “Selves.” We are both our biological functions 
and products of a history of engaging with each other 
and the world. Neither brain nor body function can be 
separated from past, present or even potential actions. 
As we go about our lives, our bodies function, we live 
through situations and integrate language with our 
modes of action. It may seem surprising that health is 
so non-local. It will, we think, seem less controversial 
to stress the non-locality of health care. Just as health 
connects people, technologies and the living world, it is 
established, maintained and declines across a lifespan 
that relies on the changing practices of a community. 
Both health and health care are prominent examples 
of a non-local phenomena.
We have applied the principle of non-localizability 
not only to health but also to interaction, mind and 
body. Its scope includes the whole of the domain of the 
living and, perhaps in different forms, of many inor-
ganic processes. While these claims are philosophical, 
they have very practical implications for how science 
is to be applied to the study of health and health care. 
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Above all, adopting the principle of non-localizability 
+,-2%#&"9&"#5"(35+#"#$,"5-#$5351"&*%,!#%'*"(++-5(*$"
to making models while, at the same time, rejecting 
the rhetoric of a Galilean style that gives access to a 
‘higher degree of reality’. Rather, we see these models 
as heuristic models that capture aspects of the world 
that demand to be understood as both relations and 
systems. Our challenge is to unify these and to do so in 
a way that has practical relevance for both those who 
are ill or suffering and also for others who, as friends, 
family, administrators and health professionals, can 
change their lives. Our approach thus endorses rela%
tional health care.8
Contributors to this book have established an inter-
national network called Distributed Health Interac%
tion (DHI).9 Using a relational approach, the aim is to 
improve health by linking studies of bodily function 
with the distributed nature of human biosemiosis, 
interaction and cognition. The group’s most general 
goal is that of taking best practices to a range of dif-
ferent contexts. The DHI network thus links health 
practitioners with academic researchers who relate 
narrowly biomedical issues to the kinds of non-local 
+$,!52,!("3,&*-%6,3" %!"',)3&"&9*$"(&"6%5&,2%5#%*&."
linguistics, ethnography, organizational studies, socio- 
logy, psychology and cognitive science. By developing 
research that focuses on health interactions we aim 
at ensuring that the work has practical consequences 
for educators, health practitioners and patients. Given 
our non-local axiology, we aim at uniting good science 
with valued practice and ways of organizing and mana- 
ging health practices. The study of cognitive processes 
C+-56),2" %3,!#%'*(#%5!." 2,3%*()" 3%(8!5&%&." 3,*%&%5!"
making and emotion work) is thus taken to be insepa-
8 This term was originally proposed by João C. Major.
9"_5-"3,#(%)&"5!"#$,"+-58-(2."<%&%#N"///D&39D37S3$%D
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rable from work based on observation of interactions 
between practitioners, patients and technologies. 
By taking a relational view, we aim to promote local 
health practices by encouraging new approaches to 
organization, healing and patient safety and care.
By placing practical concerns within a systemic 
theory, our work has implications for health organi- 
zational structures, cultures and procedures. As 
shown by Pedersen (this vol.), Galosia et al. (this vol.) 
and Steffensen et al. (this vol.), health practice and 
health education is of immense importance for both 
patients’ and practitioners’ health, well-being and 
safety. Thus while some in the Distributed Health In%
teraction program are pursuing how interactions in 
local and situational domains (i.e. on relatively rapid 
time-scales), interface with larger societal settings 
(i.e. relatively slow time-scales) others prefer to see 
how material and organizational factors constrain 
what people do. This allows us to stress that health 
is personal, inter-personal and also super-personal: 
it demands the use of non-local, trans-disciplinary 
theories and methods. While Signifying Bodies is a 
step towards connecting  health and well-being with 
interaction, biology and social organizations, it is 
just the beginning! We hope that, in the aftermath, 
we will have a part in correcting serious imbalances 
arising from our overdependence on the Cartesian-
Baconian-Newtonian tradition. There is an urgent 
need to connect biomedical knowledge with lay and 
professional abilities to use insights into health and 
health care. In this endeavour, we do not set up a lo-
*()%B(6),"&*%,!#%'*"85()"69#."-(#$,-."(%2"(#"25<%!8"%!"
better directions in an attempt to realize values (cf. 
Hodges, 2007). We hope that our focus on suffering 
and caring can contribute to better science while, at 
the same time, bettering the ecology, society and the 
lives of many people.
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